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Introduction
The spatial mismatch hypothesis, …rst formulated by Kain [8] , states that black workers, residing in urban segregated areas distant from and poorly connected to major centers of employment growth, face strong geographic barriers to …nding and keeping well-paid jobs. In the US context, and perhaps because of discrimination and high prices in the housing market in the suburbs, black workers were forced to stay in the central part of the city, far away from jobs that are nowadays mostly created in the suburbs. So the main contribution of the spatial mismatch hypothesis is to explain the high unemployment rates among blacks via the increasing distance between their residential location and their workplace.
Several papers have tested this hypothesis and have shown that bad job accessibility indeed worsens labor-market outcomes, con…rming the spatial mismatch hypothesis (see the surveys by Holzer [6] , Kain [9] and Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist [7] ). To provide an economic mechanism for the spatial mismatch hypothesis, this literature has mostly taken the point of view of workers. If indeed workers (especially minorities) reside far away from jobs, then they have poorer information on jobs and their search e¢ciency is lower than those residing closer to jobs (see in particular Rogers [13] , Seater [14] , Wasmer and Zenou [18] , Smith and Zenou [16] ). Others have argued that black workers refuse to take jobs that involve excessively long commutes (Zax and Kain [20] , Brueckner and Zenou [2] ). In any case, there is a vicious circle: because of their remote location, the unemployed minorities have di¢culties in …nding a job, and because they do not …nd a job, they stay in the ghetto.
The present model o¤ers an alternative explanation by focusing on the point of view of …rms. In our model, if …rms cannot discriminate on the basis of race by o¤ering di¤erent wages for the same job, then they can discriminate on the basis of location by setting higher job rejection rates for those residing far away from jobs, which is frequently the case for ethnic minority workers. This policy is costless for …rms since wages are higher than the market clearing wage and are downward rigid. In other words, even though …rms have no prejudices against black workers, it is rational for them not to hire black workers if they live too far away (i.e. beyond the recruitment area determined by …rms). One of the main ideas developed in this paper is that residential distance to jobs is a key factor in understanding the labor market policy of …rms. In particular, workers who reside in remote areas far away from jobs have less chance to obtain a job than those living closer. Surprisingly, there have been few attempts to tackle this issue. In the urban literature, geographic redlining (see e.g. Ladd [11] and Lang and Nakamura [12] ) involves di¤erentials in mortgage loan supply across neighborhoods or space. In other words, mortgage lenders discriminate on the basis of the location of the property so that people living in redlined areas …nd di¢culties in obtaining loans. More recently, Zenou and Boccard [21] have adopted a di¤erent de…nition of geographic redlining that is linked to the labor market. In their paper, employers exogenously draw a red line between the central part of the city and its suburbs, and discriminate against central residents both in terms of hiring and …ring. They show that this policy can have dramatic consequences for inner-city black residents. They do not, however, provide a rationale for this redlining policy but rather assume it and analyze its consequences in terms of labor market outcomes.
In the present paper, we develop an e¢ciency wage model in which the red line is endogenously determined by …rms. Indeed, as in the standard e¢ciency wage model (Shapiro and Stiglitz [15] ), workers can either shirk and produce zero e¤ort or not shirk and produce a strictly positive e¤ort level. The main di¤erence here is that this e¤ort level strongly depends on the distance between jobs and the location of workers: the closer to jobs the workers, the higher the e¤ort. In other words, even if workers decide not to shirk, they will provide a lower e¤ort level if they live far away from jobs because of tiredness due to long commuting trips. Anticipating this behavior, …rms then determine the non-shirking condition, the number of workers to hire and the red line beyond which they do not recruit workers.
In this context, by solving simultaneously for the land and labor market equilibrium, we …rst show that there exists a unique equilibrium that determines the location of all individuals in the city, the land rent, the e¢ciency wage, the recruitment area and the unemployment level in the economy. We then show that decreasing the unemployment bene…t or the commuting cost borne by workers enlarges the recruitment area whereas increasing the monitoring of workers reduces the size of the recruitment areas. Finally, we show that in boom periods (where few jobs are destroyed), …rms tend to increase their recruitment area.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. In section 3, we develop the land use equilibrium, whereas in section 4, the labor market equilibrium is determined. Finally, section 5 concludes. 3 
The model
There is a continuum of workers (employed or unemployed) uniformly distributed along a linear, closed and monocentric city. The density of workers in each location is taken to be M . All …rms are exogenously located in the Business District (BD hereafter). The BD is a unique employment (and shopping) center located at one end of the linear city. In a centralized city, it corresponds to the central business district, whereas in a completely decentralized city, it represents suburban employment. As will be clear below, what is crucial here is not the location of the BD but the distance between workers' residential location and their workplace (i.e. the BD). All land is owned by absentee landlords.
1 Each worker (employed or unemployed) is assumed to consume one unit of land and to be in…nitely lived and risk neutral. Workers endogenously decide their optimal place of residence between the BD (i.e. 0) and the city fringe (x f ). There are N identical households and M identical …rms. Among the N households, there are L employed (referred to as the group L) and U unemployed workers (referred to as the group U ) so that N = L + U. Each individual supplies one unit of labor. As in the standard e¢ciency wage model (Shapiro and Stiglitz [15] ), there are only two possible levels of e¤ort: either the worker shirks, exerting zero e¤ort, e = 0, and contributing zero to production, or he/she does not shirk, providing full e¤ort. In this case, e¤ort equals e(x) > 0, 8x 2 [0; x f ] (with e(0) = e 0 > 0), contributing e(x) units to production. We assume that e 0 (x) < 0 and e 00 (x)¸0 so that the greater the distance to work, the lower the e¤ort level. For remote locations, the marginal di¤erence in e¤ort is quite small. The former assumption is to capture the fact that workers who have longer commuting trips are more tired and are thus less able to provide higher levels of e¤ort than those who reside closer to jobs. To the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical evidence of this negative relationship between e¤ort and distance to jobs, even though this claim is quite plausible and intuitive. We adopt this assumption because our objective is to develop a purely conceptual model that provides a new explanation of the spatial mismatch hypothesis. Our model could then be tested to see how relevant is this hypothesis. The worker's behavior can be seen as a two-stage decision. First, each worker must decide to shirk or not, depending on their residential location.
Since e¤ort is costly, it is clear that the workers who live the closest to jobs will be more inclined to shirk that those residing further away. Thus, contrary to Shapiro and Stiglitz [15] and Zenou and Smith [22] (who introduce space in an e¢ciency wage model), the moral hazard problem is here locationally dependent. Second, once the worker has decided not to shirk (this is the behavior we will focus on), he/she must decide how much e¤ort he/she provides. This decision is also locationally dependent since we assume that workers who have longer commutes are more tired and provide less e¤ort than those who live closer to jobs.
Observe that the Shapiro-Stiglitz model is a special case of ours when x = 0, i.e., when workers are all located in one location, the BD, or more generally when space does not a¤ect e¤ort. Observe also that our model is quite di¤erent from models with heterogeneous workers (such as Weiss [19] , or Gottfries and McCormick [5] ) in which …rms face an adverse selection problem because they do not observe the e¤ort or the ability of each worker. In the present urban model, …rms know the residential location (or the postal address) of each worker and it is assumed that workers cannot misreport their location. There is therefore no adverse selection problem but a moral hazard one.
The land use equilibrium
Each employed worker goes to the BD to work and incurs a …xed commuting cost t per unit of distance. He/she also pays a land rent R(x) and earns a wage w (that will be determined in the labor market equilibrium) so that the instantaneous (indirect) utilities of a non-shirker and a shirker residing at a distance x from the BD are respectively given by:
As it should be clear, our formulation does not treat labor-leisure trade o¤s even though these could a¤ect our results since workers with longer commutes have less leisure than those with less commutes. In order to focus on redlining with risk-neutral workers, we have kept our model as simple as possible with a linear utility function in which e¤ort at work, commuting costs and rent all enter additively and land consumption is unitary regardless of location.
Concerning the unemployed, they commute less often to the BD since they mainly go there to search for jobs. Thus, they incur a …xed commuting cost of st per unit of distance, with 0 < s < 1. For example, s = 1=2 implies that the unemployed make only half as many BD trips as the employed workers. The unemployed workers earn a …xed unemployment bene…t b > 0 exogenously …nanced by the government and bear spatial costs (the land rent R(x) and the commuting costs). The instantaneous (indirect) utility of an unemployed worker is thus equal to:
We are now able to derive the bid rents of all workers in the city. 4 Since, in equilibrium, the e¢ciency wage is such that nobody shirks (see the labor market analysis below), we have to determine the land use equilibrium for non-shirker and unemployed workers only. In this context, their bid rents are respectively given by:
To guarantee that the bid rent curve of the employed workers is downward sloping, we assume throughout that
which means that tx + e(x) is increasing in x despite e 0 (x) < 0. To understand this, observe that commuting cost tx includes more than just money costs. It also includes these negative e¤ects of a longer commute such as non-workrelated fatigue. So even though people bene…t from working less hard on the job as x goes up, the other e¤ects of tiredness (along with the money and time outlay on commuting) make the person worse o¤ overall. Now, by denoting by x b the recruitment area of …rms (the 'red line'), which is equal here to the border between the employed and the unemployed, we easily obtain the following result (see Figure 1 for an illustration):
Then, in equilibrium, the employed reside close to the BD whereas the unemployed live at the outskirts of the city.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Observe that the condition t > ¡e 0 (x b )=(1 ¡ s) is a more stringent version of (6), and is not implied by it. Let us now give the intuition of Proposition 1. An increase in distance x has o¤setting e¤ects on employed workers: they pay higher commuting costs but lower e¤ort is exerted on the job. The net e¤ect is thus less than the pure commuting cost e¤ect, and the question is whether this net e¤ect is stronger than the shrunken commuting cost e¤ect for unemployed workers, which is smaller than that of the employed worker because s < 1. In this context, when the commuting cost t is high enough, the employed workers reside close to jobs by outbidding the unemployed.
Observe that if the sign of the above inequality is reversed, i.e. t < ¡e 0 (x b )=(1 ¡ s), then we have the opposite spatial pattern in which the unemployed reside close to jobs. Since the aim of this paper is to propose a new mechanism of the spatial mismatch hypothesis, we only focus on the equilibrium where the unemployed are far away from jobs. This spatial pattern is consistent with several US 'edge'cities (like for example Houston, Los Angeles or Phoenix; see Glaeser, Kahn and Rappaport [4] ) where jobs are located in the suburbs and most unemployed in the city-center where land rents are quite low. Our equilibrium does capture the spatial pattern of these cities since our BD can be viewed as a suburban business district and the unemployed reside in low-rent locations far away from jobs.
[Insert F igure 1 here]
Let us now give a formal de…nition of the land use equilibrium taking the labor market outcomes (w and L) as parameters. By assuming, without loss of generality, that the opportunity cost of urban land is zero, we have:
Equations (7)- (8) are the population constraints for a linear city in which workers consume one unit of land and the density of workers is equal to 1.
Equations (9)- (10) re ‡ect the equilibrium conditions in the land market that ensure that the land rent is continuous (see Figure 1) . Solving (7)- (10) yields:
Observe that, in equilibrium, all the unemployed obtain V U and all the employed V L , whatever their location. This is because mobility is costless and the land rent compensate workers for di¤erent locations. By plugging (13) and (14) into (4) and (5), we easily obtain the land rent equilibrium R(x). It is given by:
Observe also that equation (11) de…nes a one-to-one relationship between x b and L. So, we can solve the labor equilibrium either in terms of x b or L. Since the focus of this paper is on redlining, we have chosen to express everything in terms of x b in order to determine the optimal recruitment area x b chosen by …rms.
The labor market equilibrium
We can now give a formal de…nition of equilibrium in the labor market. This de…nition incorporates the outcomes of the land use equilibrium (equations (11)- (14)) so that the land use equilibrium and the labor market equilibrium are solved for simultaneously. We have:
such that all agents (workers and …rms) maximize their respective objective function, i.e. this triple is determined by a wage-setting mechanism, a steadystate condition on unemployment and an optimal recruitment area decision. 
The e¢ciency wage
In the labor market, …rms cannot perfectly monitor workers so that there is a probability of being detected shirking, denoted by µ. If a worker is caught shirking, he/she is automatically …red. Time is continuous and workers live forever. We assume that changes in employment status are governed by a Poisson process in which a is the (endogenous) job acquisition rate and ± the (exogenous) destruction rate. Let us denote by r the common discount rate of all workers. Then, the standard steady-state Bellman equations for the non-shirkers, the shirkers and the unemployed are given by:
where I NS L ; I S L and I U respectively represent the expected lifetime utility of a non-shirker, a shirker and an unemployed worker,
, where V U and V L are de…ned by (13) and (14) . Equation (16) says that a non-shirker obtain today V NS L but can lose his/her job with a probability ± and then obtain a negative surplus of ¡(I NS L ¡ I U ). For (17), we have the same interpretation except the fact that a shirker can lose his/her job for two reasons: either the job is destroyed or he/she is caught shirking. Equation (18) has a similar interpretation.
Let now determine the wage setting. In the standard model (Shapiro and Stiglitz [15] , Zenou and Smith [22] ), the e¢ciency wage must be set to make workers indi¤erent between shirking and not shirking. However, in the present model, the utility of shirkers is not constant over locations (see (17) ) whereas it is constant for non-shirkers (see (16) ). It is in fact easy to see that the utility of shirkers increases as x, the distance to the BD, decreases. 7 This implies, in particular, that the highest utility that a shirker can reach is at the x = 0 (the BD) and the lowest is at x = x b . As a result, the e¢ciency wage must be set to make workers indi¤erent between shirking at location x = 0 and not 6 See the Appendix for the derivation of equations (16), (17) and (18) . 7 The intuition is straightforward. Since the land rent compensates for both commuting costs and e¤ort levels, then shirkers, who do not provide e¤ort, have a higher utility when residing closer to the BD (since their commuting costs are lower). Formally, using (2) and (15), we have:
shirking since if the worker at x = 0 does not shirk, then all workers located further away will not shirk. In other words, the condition that determines the e¢ciency wage is given by
and by using (15) and (17), we obtain:
Now, by plugging (14) into (16), and by using the resulting equation and (19), the condition I NS L = I S L (0) = I L can be written as:
where, as de…ned above, e(0)´e 0 . This highlights the nature of our e¢ciency wage. The surplus of being employed is strictly positive and does not depend on space. As in Shapiro and Stiglitz [15] and Zenou and Smith [22] , this a pure incentive e¤ect to deter shirking. This surplus only depends on the monitoring technology, since more monitoring implies less shirking, and on the e¤ort level provided by the worker located at x = 0 (the highest e¤ort level among all workers). Now using (14) , equation (16) can be written as:
Furthermore, using (18) and (20) , this can be rewritten as:
which by using (13) yields:
Finally, at the steady state, ‡ows out of unemployment equal ‡ows into unemployment, i.e. a (N ¡ L) = ± L so that the e¢ciency wage is …nally given by:
This equation (21) is referred to as the Urban No-Shirking Condition (UNSC hereafter). We have the standard comparative-statics e¤ects of the e¢ciency wage without space (Shapiro-Stiglitz [15] ) and with space (Zenou and Smith [22] , Brueckner and Zenou [1] ). Indeed, an increase in the unemployment bene…t b, the job destruction rate ±, the discount rate r, or the commuting cost t, or a decrease in the monitoring rate µ or the unemployed BD-trips s raise the e¢ciency wage. For the non-spatial elements, b, ±, r and µ, the reason is that …rms have to increase their wage to meet the UNSC so that no worker will shirk. For the spatial elements, t and s, …rms have to compensate their employed workers for spatial costs. Indeed, when setting their (e¢ciency) wage, …rms must compensate the spatial cost di¤erential between the employed and the unemployed. For the employed and the unemployed who both live at x b (this is the redline that will be optimally determined by …rms in the next section) this di¤erential is exactly equal to (1 ¡ s)tx b because they pay the same land rent. Now, since mobility is costless, all the employed and unemployed workers obtain respectively the same utility level whatever their location. Therefore, the spatial cost di¤erential between any employed and unemployed worker is equal to (1 ¡ s)tx b .
All these elements imply that the e¢ciency wage has two roles: to prevent shirking (incentive component) and to ensure that workers are locationally indi¤erent (spatial compensation component). The key relation here is the interaction between the e¤ort function e(¢) and the location of workers. What is crucial in this wage setting process is that, even if …rms observe the workers' location, we do not allow them to o¤er di¤erent wages according to residence location. This is a legal constraint based on the fact that, in the real world, one never observes …rms that discriminate across identical workers according to their location. There are some …rms (especially in Japan) that do subsidize commuting costs but do not set wages that are location dependent.
Our setting thus implies that there is a fundamental asymmetry between workers and …rms. All workers get the same e¢ciency wage whatever their location. However, they do not contribute the same level of production because e¤ort decreases with distance to jobs. In other words, even though the wage cost is location independent the production is not. This implies that the per-worker pro…t decreases with distance to jobs. The next natural step of our analysis (which will be done in the next section) is thus to calculate the per-worker pro…t for each …rm and to determine the red line beyond which …rms do not hire workers. It is this asymmetry between workers and …rms that makes the redline story interesting. If wages were location dependent, then there would be no redlining (at least from the …rms' perspective) since the per-worker pro…t would be location independent and …rms would just pay wages contingent on the e¤ort level provided.
The interesting implication of this paper is that it can explain the spatial mismatch hypothesis from a very di¤erent viewpoint. Distance to jobs is harmful not because workers have low information about jobs (search) or because commuting costs are too high but because …rms do not hire remote workers. Indeed, if …rms cannot discriminate in terms of location (make wages location dependent), they do anticipate that remote workers provide lower e¤ort level. So they stop recruiting workers residing too far away.
In order to determine the recruitment area x b , it is crucial to understand the relation between the e¢ciency wage and x b . The following proposition gives the properties of this relation:
Proposition 2 The properties of the e¢ciency wage w de…ned by (21) are the following:
(i) The e¢ciency wage w is increasing and convex with respect to x b ;
(ii) Its limit when x b tends to N=M (= x f ) is given by: Proof. See the Appendix.
The following comments are in order. First, the key result here is the positive relation between w and x b . Indeed, there are two e¤ects raising the wage when x b rises, the reduction in unemployment and the need to compensate for the higher commuting costs of the marginal employed worker. There is one e¤ect tending to reduce the wage, namely, the lower the e¤ort level of the marginal worker. However, because we focus on a spatial structure in which the employed have steeper bid rents than the unemployed, so that t is large enough (see Proposition 1), the …rst two e¤ects dominate the third one and thus the relationship between x b and w is always positive.
Second, (ii) in Proposition 2 is a standard result that states that full employment is not compatible with e¢ciency wages. Indeed, if this were not true, then …rms could always set an e¢ciency wage at the full employment level. In this context, workers would always shirk because, even if they were caught shirking, they could always …nd a new job. This is in contradiction with the nature of e¢ciency wages. Finally, the last result (iii) of Proposition 2 just states that, at zero employment level, …rms still set a positive (e¢ciency) wage.
The determination of the recruitment area
There are M identical …rms (j = 1; :::; M) in the economy. All …rms produce the same composite good and sell it at a …xed market price p (this good is taken as the numeraire so that its price p is set to 1). We assume that all jobs are obtained through an employment agency that coordinates workers in such a way that each …rm employs only one worker at each location. 8 Since all …rms and workers are (ex ante) identical and since the density of workers at each location is M , we focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which each …rm sets the same x b . This is quite reasonable since, ex ante (before location), all workers are equally productive (location is not a characteristic of a worker), and, ex post (once located), they are all indi¤erent to work in any of the M …rms since all …rms are located at 0 and o¤er the same wage w. In this context, since all …rms are identical, the employment level in each …rm j is equal to:
We are now able to calculate the total production (or e¤ort) level provided in each …rm. It is given by:
It is interesting to observe that the average production (or e¤ort) in each …rm is given by e av = 1
e(x)dx, with
In words, a larger recruitment area decreases the average e¤ort level in each …rm since new hired workers produce less e¤ort because they live further away. Each …rm j = 1; :::; M has the same production function given by f(e). We assume that f (¢) is twice di¤erentiable with f (0) = 0, f 0 (e) > 0 and f 00 (e) · 0, and satis…es the Inada conditions, i.e. f 0 (0) = +1 and f 0 (+1) = 0. In this context, each …rm chooses its recruitment area x b that maximizes its pro…t by 8 In the …rst period, the timing is as follows. All N workers apply for a job in the employment agency and only L of them obtain a job and locate somewhere in the city (since they are indi¤erent between all locations between 0 and x b ). Then, the employment agency allocates workers to …rms in such a way that each …rm recruits one worker at each location. This is true at any moment of time (and in particular in the steady state) since, at each period, some workers with di¤erent locations lose their job and new workers obtain a job and reside somewhere in the city between 0 and x b . Then again, the employment agency allocates these new workers to …rms in such a way that each …rm (those who has lost workers) employs only one worker at each location.
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taking the e¢ciency wage as parametric. Formally,
The …rst order condition yields:
This equation states that the optimal recruitment area x b chosen by each …rm is such that the marginal productivity of workers is equal to their cost per e¢ciency unit of labor. This determines the labor demand in each …rm. Now, since all …rms are identical, by symmetry, all x b are equal and given by (23).
Since there are M …rms in the economy, the aggregate production function F (M e) = M f (e) and the total labor demand in the economy is equal to L = M x b . The aggregate equivalent of (23) is thus given by:
It is easy to verify that the labor demand x b is downward sloping in the plane (x b ; w). Indeed, by totally di¤erentiating (24), we easily obtain:
The steady-state equilibrium
Since we know how w and x b are related, we have:
Then, there exists a unique labor market equilibrium in which the equilibrium recruitment area x ¤ b is (implicitly) de…ned by 9 The second order condition is given by
Observe that since F (M e) = M f (e), we have
the equilibrium e¢ciency wage w ¤ by (21) and the equilibrium employment level L ¤ by
Proof. See the Appendix. This result gives a unique recruitment area x ¤ b and a unique e¢ciency wage w ¤ . Using (11), we obtain the equilibrium employment level in the economy
We can then deduce the equilibrium level of unemployment
Observe that the recruitment area x ¤ b a¤ects both the quality of the workers and the e¢ciency wage. Indeed, when x ¤ b increases, the average e¤ort level in each …rm decreases (see (22) ) but the equilibrium e¢ciency wage w ¤ increases (see Proposition 2) . The latter result is true only if the e¤ort of the workers is not too sensitive to the length of the recruitment area. Observe also that, as in the standard e¢ciency wage model, urban unemployment is involuntary. Indeed, even though the unemployed workers are ready to work for a lower wage in order to get a job, …rms will never accept this o¤er because the UNSC will not be respected and all workers will shirk. Therefore it is the presence of high and sticky wages that create (involuntary) unemployment. In this context, taking space into account increases the level of unemployment since spatial e¢ciency wages are higher than in the absence of commuting costs (as for example in Shapiro and Stiglitz [15] ). Observe …nally that, even by keeping the location-dependent e¤ort hypothesis, we could not obtain most of our results in a perfect competition environment (no unemployment) or in a minimum wage model (unemployment with no shirking). The virtue of the present model with shirking is that redlining is a necessary feature of equilibrium. In other words, there has to be some unemployment in order for shirking to be discouraged.
Let us now investigate the properties of the equilibrium. We have:
Then, the equilibrium recruitment area x ¤ b is increasing in the monitoring rate µ, in the percentage of BDtrips of the unemployed s and in the size of the active population N , but it is decreasing in the unemployment bene…t b, the unit commuting cost t, the e¤ort level e 0 provided at location x = 0, the discount rate r and the job destruction rate ±. For the equilibrium wage w ¤ , we have exactly the reverse e¤ects.
The following comments are in order. First, a rise in the unemployment bene…t shifts upward the UNSC since, at each recruitment area level x b (or equivalently employment level), the e¢ciency wage must increase to deter shirking. This is the standard outside option e¤ect generated by the unemployment bene…t. Because wages are higher, it is more costly for …rms to hire new workers since they are less productive (they live further away from jobs) and cost more. As a result, …rms reduce their recruitment area. In other words, when b increases, …rms employ workers who live closer to jobs that are therefore more productive but pay them more. Second, we have the opposite result concerning the monitoring technology µ. Indeed, if …rms monitor their workers more, the e¢ciency wage is lower so that …rms extend their recruitment area. Third, increasing the unit commuting cost t borne by workers or decreasing the number of BD-trips s reduces the recruitment area x b . The intuition is exactly the same as for b but here the e¢ciency wage must increase not to deter shirking but to spatially compensate employed workers (this is the compensation e¤ect mentioned above). Fourth, when the maximum e¤ort provided in the city, e 0 , increases, the e¢ciency wage increases because globally all workers provide more e¤ort (a rise in the intercept e 0 shifts upward the non-shirking e¤ort curve e(x)). As a result, …rms hires less workers and thus reduce x b . Finally, when there are more technological shocks in the economy so that jobs are destroyed more often (± increases), then …rms have to increase their wages to deter shirking and thus to reduce their recruitment area.
Conclusion
We have developed a model in which …rms set e¢ciency wages and determine their optimal recruitment area. We have shown that it is rational for them not to hire workers residing in remote areas because their productivity is lower than those residing closer to jobs. This is because workers who experience longer commuting trips are more tired and thus less e¢cient than those who have shorter journey-to-work patterns.
Our main results are the following. We …rst show that there exists a unique equilibrium in which land and labor market equilibria are solved for simultaneously. We then show that labor market as well as spatial parameters do in ‡uence the equilibrium recruitment area set by …rms. In particular, a rise in the unemployment bene…t or in the commuting cost increases wages and reduces this recruitment area. Finally, our model can shed some light on the spatial mismatch hypothesis that puts forward distance to jobs as the main culprit for the high unemployment rates among ethnic minorities. Since the latter tend to reside far away from jobs, …rms do not hire them, not because employers are prejudiced, but because their e¤ort level is too low.
APPENDIX Proof of Proposition 1
By di¤erentiating (4) and (5), we obtain:
Using (6), it is easy to see that all bid rents in the city are decreasing from the center to the periphery. We would like now to show that the employed workers reside close to the BD and the unemployed further away. For that, we need to show that, at the border x b between the employed and the unemployed, we have:
This is true if and only if t > ¡e
Derivation of equations (16), (17) and (18) The derivation of (16) and (18) are as follows. As stated above, changes in employment status are assumed to be governed by a Poisson (or Markov) process with two states: 'employed' and 'unemployed'. The key feature of these stochastic processes is that the duration time spent in each state is a random variable with exponential distribution. More precisely, if we denote by ¿ ± and ¿ a the (random) non-shirking employment and unemployment duration times, then
This implies that the density functions are given by:
Taking account of these waiting durations and by using the standard tools of dynamic programming (see e.g. Stockey and Lucas [17] ), the expected lifetimeutilities of a non-shirker employed worker I NS L and of an unemployed worker I U can then be written as: 
Finally, by using the values of the two density functions above f (¿ a ) and f (¿ ± ), and after some calculations, we obtain (16) and (18) respectively. The derivation of (17) is a little bit more complicated since, when employed, a shirker can lose his/her job because either he/has been caught shirking or the job has been destroyed. By denoting by ¿ µ the (random) length of time until the next control of shirking occurs, this implies that ¿ a is still the (random) unemployment duration time whereas min(¿ ± ; ¿ µ ) is now the employment duration time for a shirker. Since we know (see for example Kulkarni [10] , ch. 5) that min(¿ ± ; ¿ µ ) is a random variable characterized by an exponential distribution of parameter ± + µ, i.e. (ii) and (iii) : Using (21), these conclusions are straightforward.
Proof of Proposition 3
On one hand, from Proposition 2, we know that w is an increasing and convex function of x b , whose intercept is a positive constant (b + e 0 + e 0 (± + r)=µ > 0) and has an asymptote at x b = x f = N=M . On the other, from (25), the labor demand (24) is decreasing in the plane (x b ; w) and 
Proof of Proposition 4
The two equilibrium equations (21) and (24) 
